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COUNTING VOTES AND DISCOUNTING HOLDINGS IN THE
SUPREME COURTS TAKINGS CASES
RICHARD J. LAZARUS"
The regulatory takings issue is notoriously muddled.' Dramatically opposing views regarding the proper relationship between

private property and government regulation consistently have
polarized scholarly debate.2 The Supreme Court today seems no
less splintered on the issue's proper resolution than it was when
it first embarked down the regulatory takings path with Justice
Holmes's opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,' from which Justice Brandeis sharply dissented. The
Court's regulatory takings decisions are among its most conten-

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University School of Law. This Essay is based
on a presentation given April 11, 1996, at a Symposium on Defining Takings: Private Property and the Future of Government Regulation sponsored by the William &
Mary School of Law's Institute of Bill of Rights Law. I would like to thank Professor Lynda L. Butler for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and
Georgetown University law students Andrea Blander and Andrew Schaefer for their
research assistance in preparing this Essay. Finally, I served as counsel for governmental entities in many of the Supreme Court regulatory takings cases discussed in
this Essay. This Essay expresses my views alone and not necessarily those of my
clients in any of those cases.
1. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
2. Compare, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that the Eminent Domain Clause and

parallel clauses in the Constitution render many reforms of the 20th century, such
as zoning, constitutionally suspect), with Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's constitutionally based argument in Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain for rolling back
the welfare state through traditional property rights); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings
Seriously. An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1830 (1986) (book review)
(asserting that critical insights best expose Epstein's Takings "pretenses to analytical
power"); and Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 279, 292 (1986) (book review) (stating that the legal and economic world are too complex for Epstein's "simple formal rules").
3. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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tious. Many are decided by closely divided votes.4 Individual
Justices seem to waver with regularity on the issues, prompting
majorities in one case to become dissents in another, and vice
versa, thereby further deepening the precedental confusion.5
This Essay focuses on a dimension of the regulatory takings
issue that has received relatively little attention in what is otherwise a vast amount of literature on the topic: Why the Court
is so persistently splintered and its precedent so seemingly
schizophrenic. Most academic discussion has focused on the
sheer difficulty of reconciling the public's firmly held conception
of sacrosanct private property rights with the public's increasing
demand for restrictions on the exercise of those same rights
when they affect others adversely.6 This Essay's thesis is that
reasons for this phenomenon exist beyond those that have dominated the ongoing academic discourse. These additional reasons
are best revealed by piercing the popular fiction that the Court
is a monolithic institution. The Court's decisions should instead
be read keeping in mind the fact that the Court is simply nine
individual Justices who speak through the voice of shifting coalitions of at least five Justices.

4. See discussion infra Part I and note 9.
5. See discussion infra Part IIA.
6. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERI-

CAN CONST1TUTIONALISM (1990); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REv. 77, 78 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1224-45 (1967); Rose, supra note 1, at 594-97; Joseph L. Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); see also Jed
Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1096 (1993) (criticizing legal scholarship that
focuses on "the irreconcilable conceptual demands made on the idea of private property within our legal system" as "taking takings thinking too seriously"); Carol M.
Rose, Property As the Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996). Professor
Rose has stated:
The rhetoric of property often seems to resound with the notes of heroic
autonomy ... . But such heroic rhetoric rests on the quite mistaken
notion that this most intensely social of institutions hinges on individualism alone, whereas in fact it thoroughly mixes independence and cooperation. Indeed, taken to an extreme, the in-your-face rhetoric of property
rights can undermine actual institutions of property, suggesting that anything goes, and that the property owner need not care in the least for
his fellows.
Id. at 365.
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Such a piercing of the Court's judicial veil offers three lessons
about regulatory takings. First, it suggests the propriety of discounting the import of the Court's precedent in individual cases
and the futility of reconciling what may be, at bottom, irreconcilable rulings. Advocates and legal academics who ignore this lesson routinely conflate the significance of the Court's precedent in
takings cases.
Second, by identifying the underlying reasons for the Court's
splintering and shifting majorities, students of the regulatory
takings issue, as well as members of the regulatory and regulated communities, can appreciate better the full dimensions of the
issue. By examining the votes of individual Justices in each of
the cases, the questions asked at oral argument, and the arguments made in the briefs, one discovers the full panoply of factors that have influenced the Justices in takings cases. These
factors extend beyond the traditional debate between prepolitical
and civic conceptions of property. By tugging in an oppositional
fashion at the Justices, these factors implicate a host of crosscutting issues that make maintaining the development of a stable
majority on regulatory takings issues especially difficult.
Finally, a more focused examination of the individual Justices
suggests the kinds of arguments that a new majority coalition of
Justices now on the Court might find acceptable. Justice Kennedy will be the decisive vote in the establishment of this new majority, and pragmatism will need to replace adherence to purist
principles in any advocacy designed to promote an analytical
framework capable of being embraced by a new majority led by
Justice Kennedy.
This Essay consists of three parts, followed by a brief conclusion. The three parts roughly mirror the three lessons to be
learned in undertaking a closer examination of the reasons why
the Court's regulatory takings precedent exhibits such conflict
and doctrinal instability. First, the Essay describes the general
benefit gained from thinking of the Court as nine distinct Justices
in analyzing the Court's precedent, with illustrations from the
Court's takings precedent. Next, in.an effort to identify the wideranging factors that actually are at work in establishing a majority on the Court in particular cases, the Essay explores a variety of source materials, ranging from opinions of individual Jus-
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tices to oral argument transcripts to the briefs of the advocates
themselves. Finally, the Essay makes a preliminary attempt to
identify an analytical framework for the regulatory takings issue
that, although lacking purity of principle and perhaps bordering
on the nihilistic, may provide instead the level of pragmatism
necessary to strike an acceptable balance between opposing views.
I. LESSON NUMBER ONE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION'S "RULE OF FIVE" FOR UNDERSTANDING AND
RELYING UJPON THE CoURT's REGULATORY TAKINGS PRECEDENT

Supreme Court lore reports that Justice Brennan would ask
his new law clerks to identify the single most important rule of
constitutional law. Following a heated debate, with each law
clerk undoubtedly seeking to impress the Justice with his or her
profound understanding of federal constitutional law, Justice
Brennan reportedly would announce them all wrong. The most
important rule, he would declare, is the "rule of five"--i.e., the
Court decides cases by a majority vote of at least five Justices.'
Justice Brennan reportedly practiced what he preached. Upon
his resignation from the Court, many testified to his special ability to forge surprising majority coalitions in controversial cases.'
The regulatory takings cases illustrate well the importance of
the "rule of five." Many of the decisions have only five Justices
joining the majority opinion, and there has been no consistent
majority.9 The difference between the majority and dissent has
been stark, just as it first was in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon."° The reasoning of the majority in one case becomes
7. Mark V. Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
748, 763 (1995).
8. See Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990); Abner J. Mikva, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10 (1990); Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990); Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 33, 37-38 (1990).
9. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina

Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); San

Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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that of the dissent in the next (and vice versa)-sometimes with
very little time separating the Court's changing decisions.
Consider, for example, the Court's famed 1986 Term takings
trilogy, wherein the Court decided in rapid succession three significant regulatory takings cases: Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis," decided in March, and First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 2 and
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 3 both decided in
June. Keystone Bituminous and Nollan are rooted in wholly incompatible notions of the relationship between private property
and police power regulation.' 4 Although to a lesser extent, it is
similarly difficult to square the jurisprudential underpinnings of
5
FirstEnglish with the Court's ruling in Keystone Bituminous."
If one views the Court as a monolith, it is very difficult to discern the theory that unifies these three rulings. The Court certainly makes little, if any, effort to do so. If one instead views
the Court as reflecting coalitions of individual Justices, the picture becomes more clear. Justice White was the only Justice in
the majority in all three cases, but he wrote none of the opinions
for the Court; 6 nor did he write any separate concurring opinions. It is therefore more important to ask what made a difference for Justice White in these cases than to undertake a fictional inquiry into the Court's unifying theory in support of these
three rulings.
Examining the votes of individual Justices also suggests the
real possibility that one of the most discussed of regulatory takings cases in recent years, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
11. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
12. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
13. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
14. Compare Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 486-88 (maintaining that the state
can exercise its police power broadly "to accomplish a number of widely varying interests"), with Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37 (holding that land-use regulation must
"further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition").
15. See First English, 482 U.S. at 314-22 (holding that even temporary takings
must be compensated).
16. Justice White authored majority opinions for the Court in two cases raising
regulatory takings claims, Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211
(1986), and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). He
also dissented in another, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340, 353 (1986).
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Council, 7 no longer represents viable precedent, at least in the
United States Supreme Court. As in many of the regulatory takings cases, only five Justices joined the Court's majority in
Lucas.18 Justice White was, again, the decisive vote. What very
few have remarked upon, however, is that Justice White announced his resignation from the Court less than a year after
Lucas was decided. 19
Hence, the slim Lucas majority vanished almost upon its arrival. There are no longer five Justices on the Court who clearly
support Justice Scalia's rationale. Yet, commentator after commentator insists on treating Lucas as weighty precedent, without remarking on its current vulnerability." Lucas is, of course,
entitled to dispositive weight in the lower courts. Those courts
are supposed to adhere to Supreme Court precedent until it is

modified formally,2 ' no matter how clear it may be that shifts
in the Court's composition will prompt its undoing as soon as
the Court again addresses the issue. The Supreme Court is not
similarly circumscribed.2 2 In the Supreme Court, one should

17. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
18. The majority in Lucas consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See id.
19. Lucas was decided on June 29, 1992, see id., and Justice White announced his
resignation on March 19, 1993. See Linda Greenhouse, White Announces He'll Step
Down from High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at Al.
20. A number of law review symposia followed on the heels of Lucas, none of
which considered the significance of the subsequent shift in the Court's composition.
See, e.g., James E. Brookshire, "Taking" the Time To Look Backward, 42 CATH. U.
L. REv. 901 (1993); Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American Politics, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 817 (1993); John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial
Revision of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771 (1993); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV.
721 (1993); Katherine A. Bayne, Note, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
Drawing a Line in the Sand, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 1063 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy
to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts . . . ."). There are, of course, a few lower court
judges who appear to exercise a free hand with the Supreme Court's precedent. See
Francis Wilkinson, Judge Hand's Holy War, AM. LAW., May 1987, at 111.
22. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[Tlhe rule
of stare decisis is not an 'inexorable command' . . . . Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations ... ."); see also Linda Greenhouse, High Court
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expect Lucas to receive a very narrow reading.
Indeed, the litigation before the Court in Lucas reflected a
similar development. The Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous provided those defending the South Carolina Coastal Council with seemingly powerful precedent in support of the challenged South Carolina coastal development law. 3 The holding
in Keystone Bituminous seemed unequivocal; the Court largely
limited Pennsylvania Coal to its facts, concluding that a taking
had not occurred and that the state can properly exercise its
police power "to abate activity akin to a public nuisance."' All
of the litigants before the Court in Lucas, however, were well
aware that despite its recent vintage, Keystone Bituminous was
shaky, and therefore risky, precedent upon which to rely. At the
time that Lucas was decided, the Court consisted of three Justices (Stevens, White, and Blackmun) from the Keystone Bituminous majority and three (Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor) from
the dissent. At least two (Thomas and Kennedy) of the three
new Justices seemed inclined to follow the Keystone Bituminous
dissenters.' For this reason, it was risky for government lawyers in Lucas to rely heavily on Keystone if they hoped to obtain
Justice O'Connor's vote. Although they needed the vote of Justice White, who was in the Keystone majority, government lawyers could not afford to alienate Justice O'Connor. Such alienation might have resulted, however, if their advocacy left an impression that accepting their argument required Justice
O'Connor to embrace the Court's ruling in Keystone, from which
she recently had dissented. Accordingly, neither the brief filed

Asked To Reverse Ruling in a Religion Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at Al.
23. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
24. Id. at 488.
25. Justice Thomas's speeches and writings prior to joining the Court suggested

his strong support for an aggressive reading of the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause, notwithstanding his efforts during the confirmation process to distance
himself from that view. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 110-27 (1991).-Just a few months before Lucas was

before the Court, Justice Kennedy gave a speech at a law school in which he
stressed the centrality of private property rights under the Federal Constitution. See
Robert A. Chaim, Justice Kennedy Inaugurates the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture
Series, MCGEORGE MAG., 1991, at 10-11; infra text accompanying note 39.
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by the South Carolina Coastal Council nor the brief filed by the
United States as anicus curiae, made Keystone a centerpiece of
its argument.26
The same strategic considerations should now be present for
any party making a regulatory takings claim before the current
Supreme Court. The more the party links the merits of its claim
to the Court's decision in Lucas-which is what most advocates
would naturally do-the more that party would risk losing its
case before the Court. The "rule of five" is unforgiving; you need
five votes. There are, at most, only four votes on the current
Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas) to support the reasoning of the majority in Lucas.
Further, no reason exists to suppose that either of the two
Justices who have joined the Court since Lucas was decided
(Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) is likely to vote with the four
Justices left from the Lucas majority. Quite the opposite conclusion is instead likely to be true.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,27 a case that Justice Kennedy
(who provided the fifth vote) thought was easier than Lucas for
the plaintiff property owner," Justice Ginsburg refused to join
the four Justices left from the Lucas majority. She instead
joined the dissenting opinion filed by the same Justices who
dissented similarly in Lucas.29
26. See Brief for Respondent, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (No. 91-453); Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae in Support
of Reversal, Lucas (No. 91-453).
27. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
28. Although Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in Dolan, he declined to
do so in Lucas, expressly stating that he "share[d] the reservations" of his dissenting
colleagues, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, "about a finding that a
beachfront lot loses all its value because of a development restriction." Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
29. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & Ginsburg,
JJ., join, dissenting). During the Senate hearings on her nomination to the Court,
then-Judge Ginsburg was deliberately vague about her views on the regulatory takings issue, though her characterization of Lucas perhaps presaged her dissent in
Dolan. Responding to a question from Senator Pressler, she stated:
There must be dozens or scores of cases in which litigants are seeking
clarification of the line between regulation and taking. I can't offer now
anything more than to say I appreciate that the 'issue is very much
alive, and that the most recent decision, the Lucas decision is hardly the
be-all-and-end-all.
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Although Justice Breyer has not yet participated in a regulatory takings case, his testimony on the takings issue during his
confirmation hearings provides little comfort to future plaintiffs
bringing regulatory takings claims. Justice Breyer essentially
turned Pennsylvania Coal on its head. He asserted that the Takings Clause should not "go[ I too far" so as to present obstacles
to reasonable government regulation of private property."0 Like
the dissenters in Dolan,"' Justice Breyer equated aggressive
readings of the Takings Clause with the Lochner era, contending
that each suffers from a common flaw: seeking to read into the
Constitution a specific economic theory.32 Justice Breyer maintained that the Constitution cannot and does not contain such a
theory. Rather, economic theories are a "function of the circumstances of the moment. And if the world changes so that it becomes crucially important to all of us that we protect the environment, that we protect health, that we protect safety, the Constitution is not a bar to that ....
To be sure, the Court does not abandon precedent routinely
whenever there is a shift in the composition of the Court. There
is properly much force in the notion of stare decisis, albeit less
in judicial interpretation of the Constitution than in construction
of statutory provisions. Much of the Court's precedent remains
good law, despite the fact that it is likely that today's Court
would approach the same issues very differently were the individual Justices to address the issues in the first instance.
The Court's regulatory takings precedent, however, exhibits
no such judicial hesitancy to strike out anew. The Court instead
routinely has ignored recent rulings. The Court also has read its
own decisions very narrowly. That is the likely fate of Lucas
should the current Court revisit the issue. Although Justice

Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
238 (1993) (statement of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
30. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 103-31, at 22 (1994).
31. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun &
Ginsburg, JJ., join, dissenting) (MThe so-called 'regulatory takings' doctrine . . . has
an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner exemplified.").
32. See S. EXEc. REP. No. 103-31, at 23.
33. Id.
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Kennedy concurred in the judgment of Lucas,' which vacated
the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, there was a tremendous gulf between his rationale for
doing so and that of Justice Scalia's majority, which Justice
Kennedy pointedly declined to join.
Justice Kennedy rejected in its entirety the majority's foundational claim-that background principles of the common law,
such as nuisance law as applied by judges, provide an exclusive
touchstone for excusing a police power measure that severely
restricts the use of privately owned land." Kennedy insisted
that such common law doctrine should not be "the sole source of
state authority to impose severe restrictions.""6 He affirmatively asserted that on especially fragile ecosystems a state must be
able to restrict development and use more severely "than the
common law of nuisance might otherwise permit," without triggering the Fifth Amendment's just compensation guarantee."
There is no reason to suppose that Justice Kennedy's refusal
to join the Lucas majority was undertaken lightly. Justice Kennedy is not a Justice who routinely writes separate concurring
opinions that concur only in the judgment. He does so occasionally, generally joining his conservative colleagues' opinions, as
he has done in other regulatory takings cases. 8
Justice Kennedy also has declared publicly his strong inclinations in favor of an aggressive reading of the Fifth Amendment's
Just Compensation Clause for the protection of private property
rights. In a speech delivered not long before Lucas came before
the Court, he recognized the clash between the Lockean,
prepolitical, natural rights conception of private property and
the Hobbesian view that property rights emanate exclusively

34. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgement) ("The common law
of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society.").

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
writing for the majority, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ.); cf
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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from the State.3 9 Justice Kennedy commented specifically on
the Court's reluctance since Lochner to take an active role in
defending property rights and speculated that it was time for
the Court to return to that role to ensure that the right to private property does not become a "second-class right": "[Piroperty
provides the structural vehicle through which we can protect
ourselves against a blueprint for the future being imposed by
government... ever hungry for self-aggrandizement.""
Consequently, Justice Kennedy's decision not to join the Lucas
majority, but rather to write separately, is especially significant.
The Justices do not pay equal attention to all issues. As would
be expected, the Justices take greater care and spend more time
on the issues that matter most to each of them. The takings issue clearly is such an issue for Justice Kennedy. He is developing a vision of how to resolve the tensions that exist between
private property rights and the police power of the state. Although Justice Kennedy naturally is sympathetic to private
property rights, he does not believe that Justice Scalia has
struck the right chord in his majority opinion for the Court in
Lucas. Otherwise, as Justice Kennedy has done in other cases,
he would have both joined the majority opinion and supplemented his views with a concurring opinion, rather than merely concurring in the judgment.4 1
If one were to argue a regulatory takings case before the Supreme Court today, it would be sensible to pay at least as much
heed to Justice Kennedy's concurring rationale as to the rationale found in the Lucas majority opinion. It is more likely that
the view expounded by Justice Kennedy, not by the Lucas majority, speaks for the Court today on regulatory takings issues.

39. See Chaim, supra note 25, at 10-11.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1625 (1995) (Rehnquist,

C.J., writing for the majority joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.);
id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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II. LESSON NUMBER TWO: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VOTES OF
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES IN REVEALING THE CROSSCUTTING ISSUES
BEHIND THE MAJORITIES AND DISSENTS IN THE COURT'S
DECISIONS

Commentators often criticize Justices for voting in seemingly
anomalous or inconsistent ways.42 Anomaly and inconsistency
are condemned as such.43 In other disciplines, however, anomaly presents a positive opportunity. In science, for example, the
discovery of an anomaly-an observation that does not square
with established theory--can be a moment of celebration and not
despair. Anomaly presents a possible window for fuller understanding of a phenomenon being studied." Physicists developed
the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics because of the
increasing failure of Newtonian classic mechanics to explain experimental observations such as the photoelectric effect.45 In
evolutionary biology, some believe that the genetic anomaly can
provide the impetus for species adaptation and advance.46
Anomaly can be similarly useful in identifying the motivations
behind the Justices' voting in unexpected ways. Rather than
calling for conclusory criticism, the unexpected vote can be seen
42. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARV. L. REV. 687, 756-57 (1990); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The
Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J.
1647, 1658-60 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 144, 270 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 137, 326 (1989).
43. But see Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and
Justice, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2113 (1996) ("[Olur courts finally must rid themselves
of the habit of thinking that adjudicative consistency holds some inherent value tugging them away from what is just.").
44.
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less
extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only'when the
paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become
the expected.
THOMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-53 (2d ed. 1970).
45. See RICHARD FEYNMAN, THE CHARACTER OF PHYSICAL LAw 162-63 (1965); see

also id. at 158 ("In other words we are trying to prove ourselves wrong as quickly
as possible, because only in that way can we find progress.").
46. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB 186-93 (1980).
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as a window revealing the factors likely to prompt an individual
Justice to vote one way rather than another in a regulatory takings case. It is instructive to determine what competing consideration sufficed to warrant abandoning apparently consistent
decision making. 7 To that end, this portion of the Essay identifies voting patterns of several Justices. Each Justice is discussed
separately. Of special emphasis in this Essay are any votes that
might seem counterintuitive or otherwise surprising. Their surprising nature makes them potentially the most revealing. In
particular, they may suggest that those crosscutting issues underlying the regulatory takings debate play a far larger role in
influencing the Court's rulings than has been expressly acknowledged by the opinions themselves.
A. The Unexpected in Justice Voting
Justice White is the easy case for highlighting vote shifting in
the Court's regulatory takings cases.4 8 He is, however, hardly
alone. With the exception of Justice Scalia, there is a surprising
amount of movement in how individual Justices vote in regulatory takings cases on the Court. Surveyed below are the voting
patterns of Justice Brennan and several of the current Justices,
other than Justice Kennedy, who have played significant roles in
the Court's takings jurisprudence during the past two decades.
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist
Many would assume that Chief Justice Rehnquist has adhered
to a fairly steady line of decision in takings cases. Not so. Although one can fairly characterize the Chief Justice as generally
sympathetic to the claims of private property owners, his writings and votes are not without qualification and some judicial
backtracking.
For instance, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,4 9 then-Justice
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court in which he declared
47. Cf.
sistency's
truth.").
48. See
49. 444

John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REv. 59, 112-13 (1987) ("[Ilnconmost compelling claim for recognition may lie in its potential service to
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
U.S. 164 (1979).
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the "fundamental" 'nature of the property owner's "right to exclude." 0 The Court ruled in Kaiser Aetna that the federal
government's insistence on public access to a navigable private
marina constituted a taking of property requiring compensation.5 Just a few months later, however, then-Justice
Rehnquist authored a unanimous opinion for the Court in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.52 In that case, the Court
ruled that the "right to exclude" was not fundamental to a shopping center owner who had failed to demonstrate that his ability
to exclude certain leafleteers was "essential to the use or economic value of [his] property .... 53
Similarly, contrasts exist between the opinion that the Chief
Justice wrote for the Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard' and
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.5 5 The tone of Dolan is decidedly different
from the one that Justice Scalia set for the Court in Nollan. The
Dolan opinion is discernibly more tempered, more deferential,
and ultimately more respectful of the workings of, and necessity
for, state and local land-use regulation.56 In this respect, the
Dolan opinion may share some common roots with PruneYard,
which rests similarly on notions of federalism and the primacy
of state law for the definition of private property rights.5 7
PruneYard is not the only case in which the Chief Justice sided with the government in a takings case. He joined Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Andrus v. Allard," which

50. Id. at 179-80.
51. See id. at 180.
52. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
53. Id. at 84.
54. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
55. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
56. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 ("No ... gimmicks are associated with the
permit conditions imposed by the city in this case."); id. at 396 ("Cities have long
engaged in the commendable task of land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization particularly in metropolitan areas such as Portland. The city's
goals ...are laudable, but there are outer limits on how this may be done.").
57. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84-85 (referring to the "residual authority [of a State]
that enables it to define 'property' in the first instance" and "the State's asserted
interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution").
58. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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used very strong proregulation rhetoric in rejecting a takings
challenge to the Eagle Protection Act59 and the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act,' both of which restricted the sale of eagle feathers."' Rehnquist also joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion for the Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,62 which rejected most, but not all, of a takings claim brought against the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based on trade secret
disclosure requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.'
This past Term, in Bennis v. Michigan," the Chief Justice,
writing for a slim five-Justice majority, dismissively rejected a
plaintiffs claim that a state criminal forfeiture law amounted to
an unconstitutional taking of private property.' In Bennis, the
plaintiff herself had committed no crime, yet she lost her title to
an automobile that she and her husband owned jointly when he
had used the automobile in the crime of soliciting a prostitute.'
Employing somewhat elliptical reasoning, the Chief Justice's
opinion for the Court tersely stated that "[tihe government may
not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has
already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain." 7
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the role of nuisance
law in takings analysis has shifted significantly over the years.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,' Rehnquist
wrote in his dissent that "our cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the value of a
parcel of property."69 That claim is inconsistent with his earlier
dissenting statement in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1994).
Id. § 703.
See Allard, 444 U.S. at 67-68.
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994); see Ruckleshaus, 467 U.S. at 1013-14.
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
See id. at 1001.
See id. at 996.
Id. at 1001.
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
Id. at 513.
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York City7" that the Court's precedent established "two exceptions [to the Takings Clause] where the destruction of property
does not constitute a taking,"71 one of which was when the "forbidden use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others."72 Significantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not equate the
nuisance exception to common law precedent but seemed to allow for more broadly based exercises of the police power restricting such dangerous uses of property." More recently, however,
the Chief Justice joined the majority opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,74 which rejected both his Keystone
Bituminous analysis by embracing a nuisance exception 75 and
his Penn Central analysis by seeming to limit the nuisance exception to judicial application of the common law.76
2. Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan was generally a reliable vote for the government in regulatory takings cases, just as Chief Justice
Rehnquist was generally a reliable vote against the government.
As with the Chief Justice, however, factors could arise that
would prompt Justice Brennan to change his usual voting pattern. To the great dismay of government regulators and environmentalists, Justice Brennan sided with those favoring a constitutionally required money damage remedy in his dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,77 a case in which
the majority invoked procedural grounds to avoid reaching.the
ultimate issue.7" It was not long before property owners realized the potential for victory that Justice Brennan's realignment
promised, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

70. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
71. Id. at 144.
72. Id. at 145.
73. See id. ("The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not coterminous
with the police power itself.").
74. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
75. See id. at 1027-32.
76. See id. at 1029.
77. 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., with whom Stewart, Marshall, &
Powell, JJ., join, dissenting).
78. See id. at 631-33.
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County of Los Angeles.7 9

To be sure, one can posit a distinction between the Fifth
Amendment remedy issue and the threshold issue of whether a
regulation effects a taking in the first instance. Justice Stevens,
however, has the better argument in contending that the two
issues cannot be divided so neatly. 0 Justice Brennan's view
that there must be a remedy for temporary takings reflects an
intolerance toward government interference with property rights
that is at odds with the legal theory underlying the opinions
that he joined and authored rejecting takings claims on the
merits.8 ' The temporal restrictions that Justice Brennan agreed
mandate just compensation do not differ fundamentally from the
spatial restrictions that he concluded do not mandate compensation.82 In a less charitable moment in his dissent in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,' Justice Stevens chastised
Justice Brennan for failing to perceive the inconsistency and, in
Justice Stevens's view, unfairly subjecting land-use regulation to
unrealistic constitutional standards."

79. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that the government must compensate property
owners for a temporary taking).
80. See id. at 328-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 330-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Keystone Bituminous and
Penn Central).
82. See id at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Regulations are three dimensional;
They have depth, width, and length.... It is obvious that no one of these elements
can be analyzed alone to evaluate the impact of a regulation, and hence to determine whether a taking has occurred.").
83. 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987).
84.
I write today to identify the severe tension between [the decision in First
English] and the view expressed by JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in this
case that the public interest is served by encouraging state agencies to
exercise considerable flexibility in responding to private desires for development in a way that threatens the preservation of public resources. I
like the hat that JUSTICE BRENNAN has donned today better than the one
he wore in San Diego, and I am persuaded that he has the better of the
legal arguments here. Even if his position prevailed in this case, however, it would be of little solace to land-use planners who would still be
left guessing about how the Court will react to the next case, and the
one after that. As this case demonstrates, the rule of liability created by
the Court in First English is a shortsighted one. Like JUSTICE BRENNAN,
I hope that a "broader vision ultimately prevails."
Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun, J., joins, dissenting) (citations omitted).
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3. Justice Stevens

Justice Brennan did not respond to Justice Stevens's criticism
of him in Nollan. Had Justice Brennan chosen to respond in
kind, he certainly could have reminded Justice Stevens that his
own record did not reflect a wholly steady view in takings cases.
Justice Stevens has authored more opinions than most Justices
have in favor of government regulators in takings cases, writing
the majority opinion in Keystone Bituminous, concurring in the
judgment in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank," and dissenting in First English, Nollan,
Lucas, and Dolan. Many forget, however, that Justice Stevens
joined then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, having
declined to join Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court.
Justice Stevens likewise joined the majority ruling in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. s that a taking had occurred, 7 again declining to join Justice Brennan in dissent."
In Loretto, Justice Stevens embraced a per se approach to the
takings issue that presaged a mode of analysis that he subsequently criticized as unduly rigid when the Court extended its
application in Lucas. 9
4. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor's views exhibit more consistency than many
of the other members of the Court. She has tended to be among
the most aggressive in her defense of private property rights.
She joined the dissenters in Keystone Bituminous, and the majority in Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Unlike her voting tendencies
in other areas of constitutional law," she declined to join Jus-

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

473 U.S. 172, 202 (1985).
458 U.S. 419, 420 (1982).
See id. at 441-42.
See id. at 442.
Compare id. at 434-35 ("[Wlhen the 'character of the governmental action,'... is

a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking
to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public health benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner."),
with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("'[Flairess and justice' are often disserved by categorical rules.").
90. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Planned
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tice Kennedy's effort in Lucas to set forth a more moderate constitutional vision of the Fifth Amendment. Perhaps even more
revealing, Justice O'Connor has in recent years twice taken the
unusual step of formally dissenting from denials of certiorari in
regulatory takings cases in which aggrieved landowners sought
the Court's review.91 Justices generally do not formally record
their dissents from denial of certiorari. Doing so, therefore, underscores the depth and intensity of the Justice's views.
If there are any surprises in Justice O'Connor's voting pattern, they are likely to be found in her position on the remedy
issue. On this issue, her votes to some extent are the mirror image of Justice Brennan's. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo,92 Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens's majority, which declined to reach the remedy issue." Then, in
First English, Justice O'Connor joined parts of Justice Stevens's
dissent, which expressed both concern about respecting state
courts' and skepticism about the merits of the threshold takings claim.95 In First English, the landowner challenged a law
that restricted its ability to operate a camp for the disabled in
an area that the government deemed unsafe because of the
threat of flooding. 6 Review of the oral argument reveals Justice
O'Connor's concern with the dangers of such a use of the property. 7 That same concern also may have provided the impetus for
Justice Scalia's assertion in the majority opinion in Lucas that

Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
91. See Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995) (Thomas, J., with
whom O'Connor, J., joins, dissenting); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S.
1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., with whom O'Connor, J., joins, dissenting).
92. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
93. See id. at 348-53.
94. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 335-39 (1987) (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., join,
dissenting as to Parts I and III).
95. See id. at 322-28 (Stevens, J., with whom Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., join,
dissenting as to Parts I and III).
96. See id. at 307-08.
97. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States at 26, First English (No. 85-1199) [hereinafter First English Oral Argument
Transcript] (questions posed by Justice O'Connor) ("[D]o you think that local governments don't have authority to engage in flood control regulation? . . . And does the
church plan to rebuild on a flood plain where people have been killed?").
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prohibiting development that would flood another's property
could destroy all economic value without constituting a taking of
property." Because Justice O'Connor supplied Justice Scalia
with the crucial fifth vote in Lucas, Justice Scalia may have
been responding to Justice Brennan's "rule of five. "
5. Justice Scalia
No one could contend that Justice Scalia has not adhered to a
firm position in the regulatory takings cases. Property owners
have no greater ally on the Court. He opposed the property
owner's loss in Keystone Bituminous10 and voted with the majority in support of private property rights in First English,
Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan. Not coincidentally, his majority opinions for the Court in both Nollan and Lucas included some of
the most sweeping and potentially far-reaching rhetoric promoting Fifth Amendment protection of private property rights
against governmental encroachment.''
To discover the revealing anomalies in Justice Scalia's votes,
one must look beyond the regulatory takings cases. When other
members of the Court have wavered somewhat in takings cases
in response to competing concerns, Justice Scalia alone has not.
By not doing so, however, he necessarily has produced some tension between his takings jurisprudence and his opinions in other
areas of constitutional law. Missing from Justice Scalia's analysis in the takings cases is his typical concern that courts not

98. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505. U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101.
We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a
pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the police
power as a "Substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We
are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose
is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
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invoke the Constitution to upsef laws enacted by the democratically elected legislative branch." 2 Gone is his normal penchant
for restricting the meaning of the Constitution to the original
intent of the Framers.' 3 Likewise, remarkably absent is any
concern with federal courts invoking the federal Constitution to
override the judgments of state and local governments-a federalism concern.'"'
B. The CrosscuttingIssues
There are, of course, many possible explanations for Justices
shifting their views in regulatory takings cases. One very likely
possibility is that the individual Justices are not nearly as obsessive as academics suppose them to be about the precise
meaning of every specific word or phrase in the opinions that
they write or join. Commentators, therefore, are mistaken if they
believe that they gain tremendous insight into a particular
Justice's thinking by performing such word parsing. The opinions are often a joint product, very much the result of collaborative efforts among the Justice, his or her law clerks, and the
views of other chambers. 5 When the opinion is one for the
Court or for several Justices joining in a separate opinion, accommodation of competing views is necessary. 6

102. See Humbach, supra note 20, at 771-72; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMIERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 229-30 (1990) (criti-

cizing Richard Epstein's reading of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause
as permitting judicial usurpation of legislative judgment).
103. See Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists:A Critical Comparisonof Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 61-63 (1994); see also BORK, supra note 102,
at 230 ("My difficulty is not that Epstein's constitution would repeal much of the New
Deal and the modem regulatory-welfare state but rather that these conclusions are not
plausibly related to the original understanding of the takings clause.").
104. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:A Comment
on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 307, 310-28 (1993).
105. See Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law:
Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J.
191, 229-30 (1991) ("Supreme Court opinions are becoming less . . . the product of
an individual and powerful mind, less an original text or primary source providing a
theoretical model for scholarship, and more the product of 'bureaucratic writing' by
law clerks.... They are the proverbial 'work of many hands.'").
106. See Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105

YALE L.J. 2235, 2239 (1996).
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The Justices also react to the facts of the cases before them
based on their own life experiences. There may be no conscious
or even desired effort to develop a coherent unifying legal position. Consider, for example, Justice Powell's sympathy for the
historic preservation regulation challenged in Penn Central and
his hostility toward restrictions on coal mining challenged in
Keystone Bituminous. °7 Justice Powell's contrasting votes
might reflect nothing more than his appreciation for historic
preservation and coal. Each is well established in his home state
of Virginia, where one finds both Colonial Williamsburg and a
heavy economic dependence on coal mining." 8
The votes of the Justices, however, also suggest the crosscutting issues in regulatory takings cases. No case before the Court
exists in a vacuum removed from the Court's other precedent. A
Justice's vote in a case before the Court does not turn simply on
the particular facts before the Court. Nor does a Justice consider
the regulatory takings issue in isolation. A Justice inevitably
considers the relationship of the Court's resolution of the issue
at hand to other, broader issues that recur frequently in different substantive areas of the Court's varied docket. These socalled "crosscutting" issues provide the common threads between
rulings and, ultimately, the fabric of the jurisprudence of a single Justice.
What makes the Court's takings jurisprudence so susceptible
to vote shifting is the way that those crosscutting issues tug at
individual members in an oppositional fashion in takings cases.
"Oppositional" in this context refers to a crosscutting issue's tendency to push a Justice toward voting in a way contrary to what
otherwise might be his or her natural inclination on the primary
legal issue before the Court.

107. Cf. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States at 46, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (No. 80-231) (statement of Justice Powell) (expressing his concern, Justice Powell stated that because of the geographic characteristics of Virginia, "in many instances the land ha[s] no value whatever under the administration of [a surface mining control law]").
108. Justice Kennedy's surprising vote in Lucas may reflect his appreciation, based
on years of living in California, of the hidden perils of residential development in

potentially unstable ecosystems. See Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct 'Spin"
on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1422-23 (1993).
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For example, a Justice like Scalia naturally might be inclined
to uphold an executive branch agency's effort to make environmental regulations less demanding and costly to industry, but
nonetheless might feel equally compelled to reject the agency's
effort based on the plain meaning of the statutory language. His
overriding commitment to "plain meaning" construction of statutory language would probably trump any pro-business,
antiregulatory inclinations that he might harbor." 9
In regulatory takings cases, there are a substantial number of
crosscutting issues that have just such oppositional tendencies.
These issues may well explain much of the vote shifting that has
occurred. Even more importantly, however, they may suggest the
roots of compromise necessary for the establishment of a new
majority coalition on the Court on the regulatory takings issue.
1. OriginalIntent or Understanding
The Justices routinely debate the significance and meaning of
the Framers' original intent or understanding in deciding issues
of constitutional law."0 The basic notion that the Court should

109. In City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994), Justice Scalia wrote an opinion for the Court that rejected the EPA's interpretation of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act which would have allowed municipalities to exempt from costly hazardous waste management regulations the ash generated from the combustion of municipal waste to produce energy. See id. at 334-35.
The majority ruled that the meaning of the statutory language was plain and declined to rely on any contrary legislative history. See id. at 337 ("[Ilt is the statute,
and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the
law . . . ."). Justice Scalia's penchant for plain meaning construction of statutes and
his antipathy for legislative history are well established. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517; James
J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1994).
110. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (holding
unconstitutional a state constitutional provision limiting the number of federal congressional terms an individual can serve); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (holding that a gun control law exceeded Congress's authority to regulate
commerce under the Constitution). The body of legal scholarship on original intent
and its applications also continues to grow. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 363-72 (1977); BORK, supra note 102, at 143-259; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 93-161 (1993); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985).
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tie the meaning of the Constitution more closely to original intent is more favored by members of the Court identified frequently as conservatives than by those members identified as
liberals."' As applied to regulatory takings cases, however, the
issue of original intent wreaks havoc on what might otherwise
be natural coalitions within the Court."'
The original intent argument generally favors those resisting
regulatory takings claims against environmental and land-use
regulation. Little historical evidence exists to support the view
that the Framers contemplated that the Just Compensation
Clause would restrict nonphysically invasive police power restrictions on the use of private property."' Consequently, supporters of land-use and environmental regulation quickly find
themselves securing the flag of original intent around their
cause," 4 and conservatives, concerned about unduly prohibitive
restrictions on private property, find themselves voicing the expansive constitutional rhetoric that they roundly condemned
when previously invoked on behalf of civil rights plaintiffs and
criminal defendants." 5

111. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-46 (Thomas, J., concurring); William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEL L. REV. 693 (1976); Antonin
Scala, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
112. The "liberal" and "conservative" labels are extraordinarily imprecise in describing the Justices and potentially misleading with regard to the regulatory takings
issue given the ties of property rights proponents to Lockean liberalism. I nonetheless use these labels in this Essay for lack of an alternative shorthand expression
for describing the predilections of the Justices on certain crosscutting issues.
113. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 91-96 (1995); William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
782, 785-97 (1995); see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1289-93 (1996) ("The
reason the Framers did not address land use regulation in the Takings Clause is
that they did not regard it as a taking."). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understandingof the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 CoLUM. L. REV.
1630, 1635 (1988).
114. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as
the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of
poor relation in these comparable circumstances."); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 & n.15
(agreeing that "early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause em-
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2. Federalism
A similar reversal of positions occurs when one relates federalism concerns to the regulatory takings issue. For example,
those who support environmental protection laws that promote
national environmental protection objectives have not shied
away from overriding state and local prerogatives.116 Conservative activists, scholars, and judges, however, have decried the
subjugation of state and local governments to national interests.1 7 Indeed, the very name of the most prominent of conservative legal think tanks-The Federalist Society--expresses that
baseline position."1
Each side, however, must display some legal gymnastics in
addressing the regulatory takings issue. Conservatives trumpet
the need for federal courts to invoke the federal Constitution to
override state and local legislative enactments."' Liberals,
however, discover the sanctity of state and local autonomy in
finding no merit to takings challenges and in emphasizing that

braced regulations of property at all" and relying on the "historical compact recorded
in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture").
116. See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534-50 (1995); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1190-99 (1995); Jim Florio, Fed-

eralism Issues Related to the Probable Emergence of the Toxic Substances Control
Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1354, 1363-70 (1995); Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act
Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1244-53
(1995); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157-65 (1995).
117. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution'sForgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding,94 MIcH. L. REV. 615, 618-26 (1995).
118. See Richard Neely, The Politics of Patronage:Empowering Joe Lunchbucket, 4
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 525, 525 (1995) ("The Federalist Society focuses on shifting the level of government decision-making from the federal government to state or
local government .
119.
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such
consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to
limit the flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities ....
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
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property rights are defined in the first instance by state law. 2 '
3. JudicialActivism
Related notions of judicial activism play out similarly in the
regulatory takings cases. Liberals who tend to be the targets of
complaints asserting that they support "government by judiciary

" 121

now launch that same claim at conservatives who pro-

122
mote aggressive application of the Just Compensation Clause.
Similarly, conservatives, apparently enjoying a convenient bout
of temporary amnesia, enthusiastically turn to the courts to
champion their vision of wise social and economic policy."2

4. Government Distrust

A fourth crosscutting issue relates to distrust of government
and individual autonomy. This is an especially problematic feature of regulatory takings disputes. Liberals and conservatives
alike exhibit distrust of government, albeit in different contexts.
Regulatory takings claims, however, can bridge that gap capably, allowing both groups to concern themselves with possible

120.
[The doctrine of exhaustion] is supported by our respect for the sovereignty of the several States and by our interest in having federal judges
decide federal constitutional issues only on the basis of fully developed
records. The States' interest in controlling land-use development and in
exploring all the ramifications of a challenge to a zoning restriction
should command the same deference from the federal judiciary.
Id. at 338 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1051 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("These cases rest on the principle that the State
has full power to prohibit an owner's use of property if it is harmful to the public.");
Byrne, supra note 113, at 111-15 (describing the damage resulting from judicial intrusion into state property law).
121. See BERGER, supra note 110; BORIr, supra note 102.
122. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing both Lochner and the "'regulatory takings' doctrine" as "having similar
ancestry" and as "potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state
economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair"); Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1046 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court offers no justification for its
sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could."); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 846 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The
Court's] narrow conception of rationality, however, has long since been discredited as
a judicial arrogation of legislative authority.").
123. See Byrne, supra note 113, at 118-19.
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governmental abuses.
Distrust of government provides much of the driving force behind the property rights movement. Justice Holmes long ago
spoke of the tendency of government, if left unchecked, to define
away property rights." Richard Epstein has written openly of
the need for the courts to invoke the Fifth Amendment to guard
against majoritarian efforts to appropriate property owned by
others."m Liberals tend to support such redistributive governmental programs, so long as they provide the promise of progressiveness. In certain settings, however, restrictions on property
rights more closely approximate interests in individual autonomy and security than they do "mere" economic interests. When
individual autonomy is implicated, core liberal concerns with
governmental overreaching may surface quickly.
One can speculate- also about how these crosscutting issues
have, in fact, prompted some of the vote swings discussed previously. Justice White shifted to support the private property
plaintiffs in both Lucas and Nollan, in each case supplying Justice Scalia with the crucial fifth vote. One possible explanation
for Justice White's shift is that in each of these cases, unlike
those in which he had sided with the government, the plaintiff
sought to protect his right to build a home on residential property. 2 Notions of personal autonomy and security were directly
implicated. Concerns about governmental overreaching were,
accordingly, more acute than they might have been had mere
economic interests been at stake.
At least in Nollan, plaintiffs counsel seemed to anticipate this
advantage in presenting his argument. At oral argument, he
stressed repeatedly the strong connection between the real property rights being protected and noneconomic concerns with individual autonomy and security. Plaintiffs counsel referred repeatedly to the property's use as a "family home" for parents with
small children.'27 He emphasized the personally intrusive na124. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

125. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 344-46; Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and
the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1584-85 (1986) (reviewing
Epstein's Takings, supra note 2).
126. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28.
127. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
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ture of members of the public walking just a few feet away from
a private residence. He described for the Court how plaintiffs
small children would be playing in plain view just a few feet
from where strangers would lurk if the government's position
were upheld.'28 By the time counsel for the government rose to
defend the state law, the Justices' questions reflected the concerns raised regarding individual security and privacy."
Chief Justice Rehnquist's votes likely reflect a similar tug-ofwar. His vote and opinion for the Court in favor of the government in PruneYard likely reflected the significant federalism
concerns found in the case: the right of a state to decide the content of its own constitution and its own state property laws. 3 '
His tempered opinion for the Court in Dolan-tempered relative
to what Justice Scalia likely would have written for the
Court-similarly seemed to try to respond to the legitimate
needs of state and local planners to engage in urban land-use
planning.'3 ' His recent dismissal of the takings claim in Bennis
may be explained by his fairly traditional, conservative deference to government in the area of criminal law enforcement.'32
The advocacy in these cases reveals concerted efforts by counsel to use these crosscutting issues to create the coalitions necessary to yield a favorable judgment. In seeking to move Justices
like Rehnquist to reject the takings claim, counsel for the appelStates at 3, 20, Nollan (No. 86-133).
128. See id. at 14 ("[Pleople can walk along just a few feet from the Nollans'
house. They can see over the seawall directly into their living room.... Now, as
any parents of small children, that concerns them."); id. at 19 (stating that the
Nollans "don't want the people crossing within a few feet of their window, to go out
and ask them to cross down by the waterway and stay away from their private residence, for example, if their small children are playing in the backyard"); id. at 20

("As parents of small children, you're talking about the backyard of their home
....
[Pleople could wander back and forth right next to their windows."); id. at 28
("[W]e are dealing with a program that takes a very important concern-this is a
private residence, a family with small children-away from this family to serve a
program, a statewide program.").
129. See id. at 40-41 (questions from the Court) ("[Liet's assume there's a person
down the street that I think-I don't trust him. I mean, he just looks shifty eyed. And

he takes to walking back and forth seven feet away from my back window, back and
forth; back and forth"); id. at 42 ("Mr. Nollan thought he bought a privacy buffer.").

130. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 64-67 and accompanying text.
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lees in PruneYard, as well as the United States government in
its amicus brief, emphasized federalism concerns, including the
right of the states to define the scope of state property law and
the right to petition the government.'33 In Dolan, those who
supported the government's defense against the takings claim
similarly underscored issues of federalism and complained about
the tyranny of government by the judiciary.'
The
government's brief in Bennis also was replete with reminders of
the forfeiture's close nexus to a criminal prosecution, plainly designed to appeal to conservatives such as the Chief Justice.3 5
133. The appellees' brief focused on federalism from the start:
The Federal System of our government allows and encourages the states
to resolve their peculiar problems under state law. This court's prior decisions concerning expressive activity in shopping centers withheld federal
protection under the First Amendment, but no decision has undermined
the states' power to regulate such property to protect fundamental state
rights.
Brief of Appellees at 14, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
(No. 79-289); see also Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 21, PruneYard
(No. 79-289) ("State law conferring rights in property and defining the limitations of
those rights is, accordingly, ordinarily the source of those rights, rather than a taking
of them--especially where, as here, the pertinent state constitutional provision long
antedates any claim or investment by the [landowner]."). The Chief Justice's concern
with state law as the primary source of property law is further reflected in an exchange with government counsel at oral argument in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984), in which he questioned counsel's characterization of the definition
of "property" as a question of federal law. See Official Transcript Proceedings Before
the Supreme Court of the United States at 10, Ruckelshaus (No. 83-196). In Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion similarly stressed
that the marina at issue had always been considered private property under applicable Hawaii law. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
134. See Brief for Respondent at 30, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
(No. 93-518) ("Petitioner apparently wants the Court to return to those Lochnerian
days of heightened judicial review of economic regulation, but now under the guise
of takings analysis rather than through that already-discredited substantive due process analysis."); Brief of the National Association of Counties, Council of State Governments, National League of Cities, International City/County Management Association, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and U.S. Conference of Mayors As
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Dolan (No. 93-518) (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979)) ("Deference to the judgments of local governments in the area of land-use regulation is of
particular importance given the sensitive and complex determinations that such regulation demands.").
135. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
25, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729) ("Nothing in Lucas or
Dolan, neither of which involved a forfeiture of property that had been used illegal-
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Understanding Justice Brennan's motivation for siding with
the landowners seeking a constitutional damage remedy in First
English and San Diego Gas requires little speculation. 3 ' His
responsiveness to a crosscutting issue was fairly explicit." 7
Justice Brennan has long been concerned about government
violations of individual constitutional rights and has supported
constitutional damage remedies to deter and compensate those
violations.' It is not surprising therefore that he would not
abandon his general support for constitutional damage remedies
in determining the appropriate remedy for one specific kind of
constitutional violation, namely regulatory takings. Here again,
the briefs in the case reveal a concerted effort by advocates to
attract traditional liberal support for constitutional damage
remedies.'39 The briefs included one written by Pacific Legal
Foundation lawyers on behalf of the San Diego Urban League,
arguing that curbing governmental overreaching in land-use
regulation that adversely affected racial minorities required a
civil rights remedy.

ly, casts doubt on th[e] principle" that "if the . . . government's actions comport, procedurally and substantively, with the terms of a lawfully enacted forfeiture statute,
it may seize private property without compensating the owner.") (citations omitted);
id. ("Petitioner did not allege or prove that she took all reasonable steps to prevent
illegal use of the car.").
136. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
137. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I f a policeman must know the Constitution, then
why not a planner?").
138. Justice Brennan has authored many landmark decisions protecting individual
rights by allowing for constitutional damage remedies. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green,
446 U.S. 14 (1980) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); Monell
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (supporting constitutional damages
remedy); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (supporting constitutional damages remedy); see also DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (supporting constitutional damages remedy).
139. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 37, San Diego Gas (No. 79-678) (citing Owen,
445 U.S. at 650-51) ("[Tlhis Court . . . specifically and emphatically held that damage compensation is available and is to be awarded when constitutional rights are
violated by cities, regardless of the good faith of the action taken.").
140. The Urban League contended that:
Just as this Court has forbidden exclusion clearly based on race or national
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Fewer judicial tea leaves evidence why Justice Stevens dissented with then-Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in
Penn Central, rather than joining Justice Brennan's majority
opinion.' Justice Stevens does not appear later to have second-guessed that vote, as he has since invoked that dissenting
opinion in other cases.' A likely distinction is that Penn Central is the only takings case that involved a regulation targeting
particular properties and landowners rather than applying to all
properties equally. The general applicability of the regulation
was a factor that Justice Stevens subsequently emphasized in
Lucas while defending South Carolina's law. 4 ' Counsel for
Penn Central identified that particular characteristic as "the
vice of this landmark law."'
Finally, Justice O'Connor's votes for the majority in FirstEnglish (in part) and Yolo County45 likely reflect her lingering
concerns about the federalism implications of regulatory takings
claims.'46 Ironically, both she and Justice Brennan perceived
the same distinction between the merits of a takings claim (i.e.,
whether a taking has occurred) and the remedy issue and, in
addressing the latter, both willingly allowed other crosscutting
concerns to shift their votes."47 In First English, however, each

origin, so should this Court disallow and deter exclusion which is solely
motivated by a municipal desire to further purely parochial aims to the
detriment of the economically disadvantaged. A wide range of remedies is
necessary to ensure municipal responsibility as well as accountability.
Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Urban League, Inc., in Support of Appellant at 1920, San Diego Gas (No. 79-678); id. at 23-28 (relying extensively on needs of minorities and on Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Owen, 445 U.S. at 622).
141. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
142. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 n.20 (1987).
143. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071-74 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. Official Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States
at 28, Penn Central (No. 77-444) [hereinafter Penn Central Oral Argument Transcript] (statement of Mr. Gribbon); see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (noting Penn
Centrals concession that no taking occurs if a development restriction is the result
of a generally applicable law rather than an individual landmark designation).
145. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
146. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
147. In joining the majority opinion in Yolo County, Justices O'Connor and Brennan
agreed that compensation cannot be deemed "just" until "a court knows what use, if
any, may be made of the affected property." Yolo County, 477 U.S. at 350.
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managed to offset the other as they moved in opposite directions.
Justice O'Connor's dissent seems motivated by her belief that
the ordinance challenged in that case prevented a dangerous use
of a floodplain: the operation of a camp for disabled children. 4 '
Both the briefs that were filed in First English and the oral
arguments that were made before the Court demonstrate the
advocates' understanding that the most effective way to obtain a
Justice's vote is to use one of the crosscutting issues as leverage
to support his or her view of the merits of the regulatory takings
claim. Those supporting a damages remedy, then, stressed to
Justice O'Connor the abusive and unfair tactics employed by
land-use regulators.' In contrast, those resisting a damages
remedy sought to persuade conservative Justices like Justice
O'Connor by repeatedly emphasizing the intrusiveness of damages remedies on state and local governments and the propriety of
judicial deference to legislative judgments. 5 '
Accordingly, the Court's regulatory takings precedent is not
simply the product of a debate on the meaning of private property and its relationship to the police power. The votes of individual Justices are often as much the result of their views on other
crosscutting jurisprudential concerns implicated by the regulato-

148. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
149. See First English Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 97, at 58 (statement of
Michael Berger, Counsel for First English) ("[Governmental delays and lengthy litigation in regulatory takings cases] is the kind of horror story, Justice O'Connor, that
goes on in California, and it goes on all the time."). The property owner's efforts seem
to have had an impact on Justice O'Connor, which, despite her dissent in First English, may explain her aggressive stance in favor of property owners in subsequent
regulatory takings cases. See id. at 55 (statement of Justice O'Connor) ("IThere are
some horror stories out there of local governments intentionally running these things
through the mill indefinitely ... with full recognition that if they lose on one they
can make a minor modification of the requirement and go again and effectively deprive people forever of any use."); supra note 91 and accompanying text.
150. Environmental organizations resisting the damages remedy sought to invoke
the federalism and judicial activism concerns of conservative Justices. See, e.g., Brief
of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, National Association of Counties,
National Association of County Planning Directors, National Wildlife Federation,
Preservation Action, and National Parks and Conservation Association, As Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 13, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981) (No. 79-678) ("Implying a [d]amage [riemedy [w]ould [i]nterfere
with the [r]elationship [bletween [flederal and [sitate [a]uthorities and [b]etween the
[c]ourts and the [liegislative [biranch").
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ry takings debate. They may have inclinations regarding private
property and its relative importance, but for most Justices, those
inclinations are not the driving force behind their answers to the
legal questions presented. Each Justice looks beyond that narrow debate and seeks to develop a position that responds to his
or her view on issues such as original intent, federalism, judicial
activism, the need for judicially manageable standards, and other similar concerns, in the ultimate effort to define their own
jurisprudential identity. For that reason, scholars and practitioners seeking to proffer a workable test for regulatory takings
analysis are mistaken if they focus on the property rights issue
in isolation. In order to establish a stable majority view on the
Court, one must make a careful accounting of a variety of crosscutting issues that underlie the shifting coalitions behind the
Court's discordant rulings to date. The question of how some
Justices on the current Court might seek to accomplish that task
and what such a test might look like is the subject of this
Essay's final lesson.
III. LESSON NUMBER THREE: THE SIGNS OF A JUSTICE
KENNEDY-LED MAJORITY ON THE COURT FOR A NEW
REGULATORY TAKINGS TEST
Piercing the Supreme.Court's veil promotes understanding of
the Court's regulatory takings precedent, including both the current vulnerability of rulings like Lucas and the identity of those
factors that have produced the thin and shifting majorities supporting the Court's decisions. Such piercing also provides guidance regarding what a new majority led by Justice Kennedy
might decide in future regulatory takings cases. The seemingly
aberrant votes of individual Justices suggest where common
ground is likely to be found between otherwise opposing views.
These votes are not necessarily the product of illogic or inconsistency; they instead may reflect potential accommodation and the
seeds of future compromise between what long have remained
opposing, irreconcilable views.
Notwithstanding the inevitably speculative nature of the exercise, predicting where that compromise might be struck is possi-
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ble. This is not to suggest what the Court should do. 5 ' This
prediction, instead, involves the far more problematic undertaking of gauging where the Court's regulatory takings analysis is
likely to go should Justice Kennedy attempt to forge a new majority on the issue. Make no mistake about it-this is an exercise in unabashed speculation.
Drawing on the analysis presented in the prior two sections of
this Essay, the general ingredients of a new, centrist majority
led by Justice Kennedy would seem to be (1) Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Lucas,'52 (2) Justice O'Connor's concern
with state and local autonomy and the need to restrict activities
dangerous to human life and health,'5 ' (3) Justice Stevens's
concern with singling out property owners for disproportionate
burdens and perhaps with historic preservation laws generally,"5 (4) Justice Stevens's further concern with permanent
physical occupation of private property,'55 (5) former-Justice
Brennan's concern (likely shared by the more liberal members of
the current Court) with government abuse of police power authority at the expense of individual autonomy and security, 5 '
(6) former-Justice White's related concern with the sanctity of
the home,'57 (7) Justice Souter's concern with the limits of takings analysis and the propriety of the judicial role in overseeing
state and local land-use planning,' s and (8) Justice Breyer's
views on the impropriety of presuming constitutional codification
of a particular economic theory and the necessity of allowing for
police power restrictions protective of human health and

151. For criticism of the "fundamental rights" framework emerging in the Court's
regulatory takings cases, see Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1097-11.
152. 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
153. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 81, 138 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
158. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411-14 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court is improperly addressing issues not raised by the facts
before the Court); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076-78
(1992) (statement of Souter, J.) (voting to dismiss the writ of certiorari); cf United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1651-52 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing for
deference to the legislature).
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safety. 159

Because Justice Kennedy is the most likely instigator of a new
majority, his concurring opinion in Lucas provides the logical
starting point for developing a new framework. That opinion
certainly presents the possibility of a middle-ground position. In
his Lucas opinion, Justice Kennedy challenged both sides of the
regulatory takings debate and took a few tentative steps toward
bridging their differences.
First, Justice Kennedy challenged the two mainstay positions
of the Lucas majority. He contended that total economic deprivation was not enough to justify a per se approach. 60 He further
argued that, in any event, the common law of nuisance and other background principles of the common law do not provide the
exclusive justification for denying just compensation for such a
complete deprivation of property rights.16 '
Justice Kennedy offered in place of the Lucas majority's analytic framework one requiring an independent assessment of the
loss of value in light of the landowner's reasonable expecta"' This inquiry would include consideration of the proptions. 62
erty owner's actual intent as well as his capacity to undertake
the use, the prevention of which now forms the basis of his takings claim." Justice Kennedy also argued that mere background principles of the common law were insufficient to define
a property owner's reasonable expectations. He argued instead
that such interests could find a basis in "objective rules and
customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties in159. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
160. See Lucas, 505 U.S.

at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)

("Where a taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value,
the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investmentbacked expectations.").
161. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962)) ("In my view, reasonable expectations
must be understood in light of the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of

nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society.").
162. See id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
163. See id. at 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Among the matters
to be considered on remand must be whether petitioner had the intent and capacity
to develop the property and failed to do so in the interim period because the State
prevented him.").
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volved.""'
According to Justice Kennedy, these objective rules and customs extend to the government's "enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions ....

."'

In justifying

restrictions beyond the common law, he offered as an example
the government's need to restrict private uses on a "fragile land
system" like coastal property, even if such restrictions might
result in the complete destruction of economic value.' Such
restrictions, in Justice Kennedy's view, would not interfere with
the reasonable expectations of an owner of ecologically fragile
property.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas also challenged those
who favor governmental regulation. He suggested that not all
governmental ends would be sufficiently weighty to warrant denying compensation. He identified promotion of tourism as a
governmental goal that would not justify the absence of compensation.'67 Additionally, Justice Kennedy introduced a new dimension to takings analysis by asserting that the regulatory
means as well as the ends must be reasonable in order to pass
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause muster.'
A possible analytical framework that emerges from Justice
Kennedy's views is not unlike that which the Court utilizes in
other areas of constitutional law. Takings scrutiny would essentially have two different levels, in much the same way that the
Court applies different levels of scrutiny to decide equal protection, "69
' First Amendment, 7 ' and dormant Commerce Clause
challenges."'

164. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
165. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
167. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
168. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
169. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (applying strict scrutiny review to a
state's redistricting plan); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (applying strict
scrutiny review to a state's redistricting plan); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996) (applying rational basis review to Colorado's "Amendment 2").
170. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to political speech); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (applying intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech);
Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to cases involving religious freedom).
171. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98-
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There would, in the first instance, be an inquiry into the alleged deprivation in order to gauge its relative severity based on
its character and degree. This first-level inquiry would determine whether the takings issue at hand implicated a "core" or
"fundamental" concern of the Just Compensation Clause. Whether the landowner's deprivation warranted just compensation
would turn on that inquiry in combination with an inquiry into
the substantiality of the government's justification for the challenged restriction, based similarly on the character of the justification and the degree to which the restriction is reasonably necessary to serve that justification. The injection of the "necessary"
qualifier reflects Justice Kennedy's stated concern with the reasonableness of the "means" as well as the "ends" of the challenged restriction.
Core concerns would trigger, in effect, heightened takings
scrutiny. Just compensation would not be required per se, but
the government would have to survive heightened scrutiny to
avoid the compensation requirement. The test would make differences in kind dispositive and would turn on differences in
degree only when they reached the level of gross
disproportionality. The inquiries would remain fairly binary:
akin to heightened takings scrutiny for some kinds of interferences and diminished scrutiny for lesser interests. The courts
have utilized such approaches more or less successfully in a host
of other constitutional contexts, albeit with a tendency to create
compromising categories of mid-level scrutiny.172 Such bluntedged approaches cause difficulties at the borders 73 but are
worthwhile so long as the categories provide for easy disposition
of the vast majority of cases.
The challenge, of course, would be to identify the categories:

99 (1994) (explaining which level of scrutiny to apply in negative Commerce Clause
cases); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (finding protectionist state
statutes per se invalid under the Commerce Clause).
172. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2375-76 (1995) (describing "intermediate" level scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (describing "heightened equal protection scrutiny" review of gender-based classifications).
173. See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 419 ("This very case illustrates the
difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.').

1136

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1099

(1) the kinds of interferences with private property that would
warrant the greatest degree of protection and (2) the kinds of
governmental interests, if any, capable of justifying the most
intrusive restrictions without compensation. At one end of the
spectrum would be total destruction of economic value, which
generally would warrant heightened judicial scrutiny. Defining
the center of the spectrum is more difficult, however, and Justice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence suggests where to draw some
of the finer distinctions. Any economic deprivation under a takings claim must be based on actual rather than theoretical contemplated use, and the actual use must be clearly lawful at the
time that the property owner's expectations came into fruition.'74 Otherwise, the expectations are not sufficiently reasonable to warrant heightened constitutional protection. In addition, owners of fragile land systems would generally be on notice
that the government might need to enact substantial restrictions
on the use of the property to guard against the possible adverse
consequences of developing such land.' 7'
Justice Kennedy's concurrence also suggests that promotion of
tourism, business, and other economic redistributive goals would
not be legislative ends capable of satisfying heightened takings
scrutiny. Hence, just compensation would be required in instances of total destruction of economic value.' 7 ' Although such concerns are entirely legitimate and important bases for police power restrictions on the use of land, the Court's new majority likely
would conclude that it is proper to assign them less weight in
the takings equation than they would a police power measure
intended to prevent serious public health and safety risks. In the
former circumstances, the police power measure is exclusively
distributional in character. Depriving one property owner of all
economic value for the benefit of another competing economic
value normally would require just compensation.'7 7

174. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1033 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
175. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
176. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
177. Somewhat analogous concerns have been expressed in the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause cases. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
956 (1982) (recognizing the difference between economic protectionism and health
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On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy maintained in Lucas,
government regulations aimed at stabilizing especially fragile
land systems could satisfy the heightened takings review.178
The reasons for the governmental restriction may have
distributional or aesthetic dimensions, but they are not exclusively so. The basic maintenance of those land systems typically can
serve even weightier and more substantial ends because of the
degree and kind of harms that result from their disruption.'79
The prior votes and opinions of other likely members of a Justice Kennedy majority further fill out this new takings
framework." Permanent physical invasions or occupations
would plainly trigger heightened takings scrutiny. 8 ' So too
would interferences with property rights that implicate core private property concerns with personal autonomy and security.'82
One example would be governmental prohibition of a
landowner's construction of a single-family home for her personal use. Another might be governmental engagement in continuous, proximate overflight of private residential property."
Governmental prohibitions on traditional rights and uses of
property, such as basic subsistence activity or the right to devise, also would likely merit heightened takings scrutiny.'
Restrictions on the use of property in order to promote historic
preservation would satisfy normal takings review but would be
less likely to survive heightened takings scrutiny as applied by a
Justice Kennedy-led majority." Restrictions that would pass

and safety regulations).
178. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
179. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the.judgment).

180. See Laura S. Underkufller-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 185 (1996) (describing how under emerging Supreme Court precedent "all property interests are not held with the same intensity
and are not protected equally" and how there is a "hierarchical ordering of stringency of protection").
181. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
182. See supra notes 81, 136 and accompanying text.
183. See Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
184. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
185. Even the United States as amicus curiae in support of the City of New York
in Penn Central agreed that the historic landmark designation would amount to a
taking if the property owner was not provided a "reasonable return." Penn Central
Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 144, at 59. The federal government's argu-
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muster under heightened analysis, on the other hand, would include those that safeguard human health and safety,' as long
as they are reasonably necessary. As proposed by Justice Kennedy in Lucas, this inquiry would focus on the reasonableness of
the means. 87 A court would consider whether the restrictions
were reasonably or narrowly tailored, including the reasonableness of the fit between the government's purposes and the object
of the restriction. The government would need to demonstrate a
cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy. [So long as] the owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source of the
social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out
unfairly.188

An inquiry into the reasonableness of the means likely would
not require a distinct less restrictive alternative analysis, but
that issue will probably be a matter of considerable discussion in
the fashioning of this new approach. In other areas of constitutional law, the Court has embraced such a heightened inquiry
into means without subjecting the restriction to less restrictive
alternative scrutiny.'89 To satisfy this standard, a restriction
ment in that case was presented by then-Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald,
now a federal appellate judge.
186. Like Justice O'Connor in First English, see supra note 97, Justice Kennedy in
Lucas repeatedly posed questions at oral argument suggesting that there are instances when all economic uses can be taken for urgent safety reasons and not compensated, citing earthquake faults and coastal property as two examples. See Official
Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 15-16,
Lucas (No. 91-453). The identity of Justice Kennedy is not evident on the face of the
transcript; his identity is derived from the author's notes taken at the oral argument
itself (notes on file with the author).
187. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
188. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The Court's ruling in Pennell is especially significant in
discerning possible compromise because Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens all joined the Chief Justice's majority opinion. See id. at 3.
Justices Scalia and O'Connor joined only in part, and Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case. See id. at 20.
189. The Court currently uses this approach in the First Amendment area to determine the validity of government regulation of commercial speech. See Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380 (1995) (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) ("IT]he least restrictive means' test has no role in the
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must not be unduly over- or underinclusive. An example of impermissible underinclusiveness could be a restriction that singles out one property owner for severe use restrictions but
leaves other, similarly situated properties unrestricted. "A regulation need not be 'absolutely the least severe that will achieve
the desired end,' but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction... that is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between
ends and means is reasonable." 9 ° Where the fit is deemed unreasonable, compensation would be required.
In many respects, of course, Justice Scalia already is trying to
lead the Court to a takings analysis with his own binary framework. The substance of that analysis, however, would be very
different. Under his view, the per se takings categories-physical occupation and total economic deprivation'9 -- undoubtedly would be much larger, and the takings
test for those intrusions falling outside the per se categories
would be significantly more demanding.
Justice Brennan's "rule of five," however, likely prevented
Justice Scalia from going as far as he would have preferred to go
in Lucas. He was unable to answer the crucial denominator
question raised by the Lucas framework: "[How to] make clear
the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be
measured."'92 If the economic impact inquiry is based on "parcel as a whole" analysis, 93 compensation will rarely be justi-

commercial speech context. 'What our decisions require,' instead, 'is a "fit" between
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,' a fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable . . . ."); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480) ("It [is] the city's
burden to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its legitimate interests in safety and
esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the
means chosen to serve those interests.").
190. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
191. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992).
192. Id. at 1016 n.7. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Lucas, explicitly recognized the significance of the denominator issue. See id. ("Regrettably, the rhetorical
force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the
loss of value is to be measured.").
193. See id. at 1016-17 n.7; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 496-99 (1987) (applying "parcel as a whole" analysis); Penn Cent. Transp.
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fied-invariably some part of the property will possess residual
economic value. If the inquiry is based on a denominator that
considers just the most restricted part of the property, however,
compensation will be ordered far more routinely. Justice Scalia
no doubt would have liked to address that issue, but, in doing
so, he probably would have lost Justice White's vote and perhaps
Justice O'Connor's vote as well.
Justice Kennedy, however, appears interested in leading the
Court down a quite different path. His willingness to do so in
future cases will turn on the strength of his conviction that Justice Scalia's position is ill-advised and not susceptible to mere
fine-tuning. Even if willing, Justice Kennedy's ability to create
the new majority will also turn on the willingness of some of the
more liberal Justices to temper their own views to achieve a
more centrist position.
CONCLUSION

Wishful thinking of others notwithstanding, the "takings puzzle" has not been solved.'94 In certain respects, the pieces of
that puzzle are in as much disarray as ever. The Lucas majority
view does not solve the puzzle; 9 5 that decision is not even likely to be weighty precedent before the current Court.
The most likely solution to the puzzle will not come from Justice Scalia, even though he has written many of the Court's most
recent significant regulatory takings opinions. It will more likely
come from Justice Kennedy, who has written no opinions for the
Court on the issue. The signs of a Justice Kennedy-inspired new
majority are already evident. They present themselves both in
his surprising concurring opinion in Lucas as well as in a careful
parsing of those various votes of the other Justices that likewise
seemed initially surprising or even anomalous. Together, they
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ("raking[sl' jurisprudence does
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.... [Tihis Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... ").
194. But see Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings
Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 147 (1995).
195. But see id. at 148, 151-52.
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present the possibility a of new compromise. The willingness
and ability of those Justices to forge that compromise remains
an open question. So, too, does the impact of Justice Brennan's
unrelenting "rule of five" when change in the Court's membership next occurs.'9 6

196. The two most likely Justices to retire next-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens (with Justice O'Connor as an outside possibility)-would shift the
Court's voting in very different directions.

